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LED Theory Of Material Objects
1. Views on the Persistence of Material Objects
In this paper I present a new theory of the nature and composition of material 
objects. Material objects are thought to persist over time and survive various 
changes. For example, in 2005, the tree in my front lawn (named ‘Titan’) was just a 
sapling. In 2010, Titan had grown 5
Now there are competing views about how Titan persists through time. On 
what is considered the ‘commonsense’ view, Titan persists by being ‘wholly present’ 
at each time at which it exists. Call this Endu
On a popular alternate view 
having a different temporal part at each time
idea is that just as Titan is spread out across space, so it is spread out across time
by having parts. Here we have the parts named as ‘
that they are distinct objects. 
are all parts of it. So where Endurantism
has it that there are more things than we might initially think




-feet tall. By 2015, it is now 10-feet tall.
rantism.  
 
known as ‘Worm Theory’ Titan persists by 
 (See for example Heller 325
 α’, ‘β’ and ‘γ’ to represent the fact 
None of these objects are identical to Titan, but they 
 has only one thing—Titan—Worm Theory 





The view that I defend here is distinct from both views 
having non-concrete parts. A non
features that concrete objects typically have
abilities, etc.—but yet is unlike typical abstract objects since a non
could have those features.  
Timothy Williamson has recently argued for such objects. He argues that it is 
impossible for something not to exist. For example, in any world in which the 
proposition <Socrates does not exist> is true, it must refer t
to Socrates, then Socrates exists in that world. Hence, it couldn’t be that Socrates 
does not exist (Williamson 233)
never been born. In that case, Socrates would exist, but wo
He wouldn’t have size, shape, mass, causal abilities, etc.
Here I am borrowing this ontology to present a new view. 
has  α, β and γ as parts at each time at which it exists. 
essentially—it can never change with respect to what parts it has. 




-concrete object is an object that lacks many of the 
—size, shape, mass, location, causal 
-concre
o Socrates. But 
. Nevertheless, it’s clear that Socrates could have 
uldn’t be a concrete thing. 
 (Williamson 246).
 On this view, Titan 
Whatever parts it has, it has 
But what differs 
 2 
ts Titan as 
te object 
if it refers 
 
doesn’t treat Titan as being spread out across time. But
Theory since at each time, a different part of it is concrete.
I call this the ‘LED theory’ since material objects resemble L
boards. Just as a board is composed of numerous lights, each of which can be on or 
off, so objects are composed of numerous parts, each of which can be concrete or 
non-concrete. To make the analogy tighter, we should imagine that the following is 
also true of the display board: each light can only be on for exactly one moment. No 
light can be on for more than a moment, nor can it t
 
2. Argument for LED Theory
Why think LED theory is better than its competitors? The reason is that it is 
view that can preserve a particular 
parthood. 
  Let me begin by elucidating the notion of parthood that I have here. I take it 
to be the familiar notion that we work with when we say things like ‘the seat
legs and armrests are part of the chair’, and ‘the bits of wood are part of the seat’.
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urn on again at a later moment.
 







will talk specifically in terms of what is known as proper parthood. This notion of 
parthood is irreflexive—an object is not a part of itself. So the chair is not a part of 
itself, nor the seat a part of itself. The relation is asymmetric—if a is part of b, then b 
is not part of a. Thus the chair is not part of the seat since the seat is part of the 
chair. It is also transitive—if a is part of b, and b is part of c, then a is part of c. Since 
the seat is part of the chair, and the bits of wood are part of the seat, the bits of wood 
are part of the seat. 
 We should also notice that its coherent to think that objects can partially 
overlap. In other words, it’s possible that a and b are not identical, but share a part. 
For example, two chairs can overlap or share a part by sharing an armrest—think of 
theater seats. But what is clearly not possible is that two objects completely overlap. 
It’s not possible for a and b to be not identical yet share all the same parts. So if we 
have Chair A and Chair B and every object that is a part of one is a also a part of the 
other. Then the names ‘Chair A’ and ‘Chair B’ must refer to the same chair. I take this 
to be an eminently plausible principle. To deny this principle seems plainly absurd. 
Material objects are the type of thing that ‘crowd out’ other objects (see, for 
example, David Lewis 252). 
 
2.1 Against Endurantism 
But the problem for Endurantism is that there are cases that it is forced to interpret 
as being counter-examples to the principle. Consider the following simple scenario 
of David and Clump:  
at t1, a statue-maker purchases a piece of clay named ‘Clump’. At t
a statue and names the newly created statue ‘David’. In this scenario, Clump clearly 
continues to exist at t2. Though pieces of clay don’t survive being burnt to a pile of 
ash, or being chopped into a thousand smaller pieces, they can surely survive 
various changes in their shape
all the same parts at t2 since every bit of 
part of the other. Given No Complete Overlap, they must be identical. But the 
problem is that they are not identical since Clump existed on Monday, but David did 
not. 
Worm Theory and the LED Theory have a leg up on Endurantism since they 
can avoid this problem. Worm Theor
parts for each time at which 
t1, Clump has a t1 temporal part
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2, he shapes it into 
. So both Clump and David exist at t2. They also
clay or molecule that is part of one is also 
y implies that David and Clump have temporal 
they exist. And since David had not yet been created at





 The LED Theory also claims an advantage over Endurantism.
Clump do not currently share all the same temporal parts since they d
respect to their non-concrete parts. 
statue-shaped objects when concrete, and never has 
shaped when concrete. Clump, on the other hand is always composed of all three. 
David and Clump therefore always differ with respect to their parts since Clump 
always has κ and David never does.
 
2.2 Against Worm Theory 
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 David and 
iffer with 
David is always composed of λ and µ




, which are 
-
 
But why should we prefer the LED Theory to Worm Theory? The reason is that 
are cases similar to the David and Clump case in which the objects do not differ with 
respect to their spatial or even 
Allan Gibbard:  
the craftsman fashions the bottom half of a statue with one 
half with another, he then fuses the top and bottom halves to create the statue 
which he names ‘Davey’. Eventually he destroys Davey 
case it is clear that not only does Davey the statue comes into ex
some new piece of clay. This is because when joining pieces of clay, a new piece 
comes into existence. This piece of clay also goes out of existence at t
of clay can’t survive being cut into two
‘Clumpy’. Clumpy and Davey share all the same temporal parts since they share the 
same spatial parts and come into and out of existence at the same times. But Clumpy 
and Davey also aren’t identical since Clumpy could survive all sorts of c
shape (such as being squashed into a ball) that Davey could not survive.
 A tempting response to this problem 
temporal parts idea to include 
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temporal parts. Consider the following case given by 
piece of clay and the top 
by slicing it in half.
istence at t
3 since a piece 
 (Gibbard 191). Call this piece of clay 
hanges in 
 
for the Worm Theorist is to extend the 




 In this 
2, but also 
. 
According to this idea, we shouldn’t think of objects as spread out just in space and 
time, but also across possible worlds
In this case, the worm in the actual world is not identical to either Davey or Clumpy, 
but is just a modal part of each. In other worlds, there are othe
parts of them. But they do not share all the same modal parts since there is a 
actual world in which there is a smushed lump of clay worm
but not Davey, what I’m calling ‘
response is that there are no objects that do not 
cannot be ‘spread out across worlds’ in the sense that they have parts that do not 
exist in the actual world. 
 So the modal parts response will not work fo
does show us how the LED Theory can be extended to address the problem. And 
that is just to add objects that act 




r worms that are also 
 that is part of Clumpy 
ϕ’ in the diagram. But the obvious problem with this 
actually exist. Davey and Clumpy 
r Worm Theorists. However, it 
like modal parts. More precisely, we should think 
ld be a smushed lump 
 8 
non-
of clay, were it concrete. Though it is not actually ever concrete
avoid the claim that there are things that don’t actually exist, since these modal
parts do actually exist, though 
 In the illustration, we see that 
though each is only concrete at a single world. When 
shaped object and when χ or 
has χ and ψ as parts, but necessarily has them as parts. Likewise, Clumpy 
necessarily has ϕ, χ and ψ as parts. On this view Davey and Clumpy don’t violate No 
Complete Overlap since it’s not possible for them to share the same parts.
reason, the LED Theory is superior to the competitors considered above. It alone can 
preserve No Complete Overlap.
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. This allows us to
they are not actually concrete. 
ϕ,  χ and  ψ exist in every possible world, 
ϕ is concrete, it is a 
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